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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
JERRY DEE GRIFFITHS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860326 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Has defendant demonstrated that admission at trial 
of his post-arrest statements to a police officer, which were not 
disclosed to him by the prosecutor pursuant to a discovery order 
until shortly before trial, constituted reversible error? 
2. Did the trial court erroneously admit evidence of 
defendants prior bad acts? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's requested instructions on eyewitness identification 
testimony? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jerry Dee Griffiths, was charged with 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-6-302 (1978), two counts of aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-5-103 (1978), and possession of 
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree 
felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 (1978) (amended 1986) 
(R. 9-11). After the latter charge had been severed, a jury 
found defendant guilty of the aggravated robbery and aggravated 
assault charges (R. 33-35). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to the Utah State 
Prison for terms of five years to life for the aggravated robbery 
and zero to five years for each of the aggravated assaults, the 
sentences to run concurrently (R. 112-13). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of January 5, 1986, a manf later 
identified as defendant, entered a video store in Salt Lake 
County, approached Ron Smith, a clerk at the front counter, 
revealed a hand gun tucked in his belt under his coat, and said 
to Smith, "This is a .357 Magnum. It's loaded. You try to be a 
hero, I'll kill you." Defendant, who wore a Levi jacket and Levi 
pants, a T-shirt, and a blue baseball cap over his straggly, 
dirty blond hair, then ordered Smith to call the manager who was 
in the rear of the store. When the manager, Edward Failner, 
appeared, defendant again revealed the gun, gave a warning 
similar to that given Smith, and demanded the weekend receipts. 
Noise from a back room alerted defendant to two other persons, 
Randy and Everett Herbert, and they were ordered up front. As 
Failner moved toward the cash register, defendant, startled by 
the sound of videos being returned in a night drop, pulled the 
gun from his belt, cocked it, and pointed it in the direction of 
the drop. Once informed about the cause of the noise, defendant 
pointed the gun at two of the persons behind the counter and 
ordered them not to move. Failner quickly assured defendant that 
he would get whatever he wanted and placed the cash register 
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drawer on the counter. Defendant returned the gun to his belt, 
pointing it toward his right leg and failing to uncock it. After 
Failner placed the till money in a bag given him by defendant, 
defendant took the bag and left the store, heading in a westerly 
direction (R. 159-68, 200-05). 
Roger Mouritsen, who was at a gas station near the 
video shop at the time of the robbery, hearp a gunshot and saw a 
man who looked like defendant limping noticeably as he ran from 
the direction of the shop. Mouritsen indicated that the man was 
wearing a baseball cap and a short, dark jacket; however, he 
could not tell what color or kind of pants *fe had on (R. 236-40) . 
The next day, a doctor treated defendant for) a gunshot wound to 
his right foot, which appeared to have been caused by a .38 
caliber or high velocity .22 caliber weapon lone or two days 
before. The doctor considered the wound consistent with that 
caused by a gun tucked in the belt portion of a person's pants, 
but acknowledged that it also could have occurred during a manual 
exchange of the weapon between defendant anc another person (R. 
138-51). 
When shown photo lineups by the police two days after 
the robbery, Failner and the Herberts identified defendant as the 
robber (R. 207-09, 250; St. Ex. 2). At an in-person lineup held 
on February 4, Failner positively identified defendant, but Randy 
I 
Herbert selected another individual as the gunman* Everett 
Herbert and Ron Smith were unable to make any identifications (R. 
176, 212-14, 270-74, 286-87; St. Ex. 8, 9, lol 11, 13). 
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At trial, Failner, Smith, and the Herberts all 
positively identified defendant as the robber (R. 172-73, 206, 
277-79, 293) . Three of them noted that the robber had an upper 
tooth or teeth missing, but acknowledged that defendant appeared 
to have no missing teeth in court. It was established, however, 
that a police officer noticed that defendant had teeth missing 
when he arrested him five days after the robbery, and that 
defendant normally wore an upper dental plate (R. 177, 194-95, 
220-21, 252, 290, 298, 302). Smith explained that he was unable 
to identify defendant at the lineup because defendant's eyes were 
not as visible there as they were in the photograph or in court 
(R. 179-80, 191). Andf he did not indicate to anyone that any 
memoers of the lineup had characteristics similar to the robber's 
because he did not know to do that (R. 198). Randy Herbert 
admitted that she had identified the wrong person at the lineup 
(apparently fooled by the similarities between that person's hair 
and dress and the robber's), but she was able to state with 
certainty that State's Exhibits 1 and 2, photographs of 
defendant, were of the person who robbed the store (R. 271-84).! 
Finallyr Everett Herbert explained that he could not identify 
defendant at the lineup because his hair color appeared to be 
different. However, he was able to positively identify Exhibits 
1 and 2 as the robber (#2 being the photo he picked out of a 
photo lineup shown to him before trial) (R. 291-94). 
* Ms. Herbert first saw Exhibit 1 the morning of trial; she 
picked Exhibit 2 out of the photo lineup shown to her several 
days after the robbery (R. 276-80). 
Defendant called several witnesses in his defense. 
Randy and Everett Herbert testified that tlhey were either unable 
to identify defendant at the in-person linkup or identified 
another person as the robber (R. 270-73, 285-87). Defendant's 
mother testified that she noticed his injured foot on the morning 
of January 5 when he came to visit her at the hospital. When 
asked about the foot, defendant told her that it had been injured 
in an accident involving a Jeep. She also stated that she had 
never seen defendant with blond hair, but khew that he had a full 
set of top dentures (R. 299-302). Defendant's ex-wife testified 
that she talked with defendant on January 5 about his foot which 
had apparently been injured by a Jeep (R. 3ll-18). And, a 
neighbor testified that he noticed defendant's bad foot on the 
morning of January 5 (R. 324). 
Defendant's primary witness was hils girlfriend, Darlene 
Newsorae, who claimed that defendant's injury had been caused on 
January 4 by the accidental discharge of a gUn when it was handed 
to defendant on the front porch of his home by a man named either 
Dan or Don (she could not remember his exact name). She also 
stated that she and defendant spent the entirfe evening of January 
5 at the home of defendant's mother. Finally!, she acknowledged 
that defendant wore a full upper plate of dentures (R. 327-52). 
In rebuttal, the State called Detective Ron Edwards 
who, upon arresting defendant for the instant robbery, was told 
by defendant that he had spent the entire evehing of January 5 
alone at his residence and that he had injured his foot on that 
date when a gun handed to him by a person nam^d Mike had 
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accidentally discharged (R. 245, 361-63)• The State also had a 
weapons expert testify that his investigation of the front porch 
at defendant's home had uncovered no evidence of a gunshotf 
although he was unable to state with scientific certainty that a 
shot had not been fired there (R. 377-82A). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant fails to demonstrate that he was 
significantly prejudiced by a State witness's improper reference 
to an unrelated warrant concerning defendant* Nor does he show 
that the trial court so abused its discretion in admitting the 
identification testimony of a person not at the scene of the 
instant robbery that a likelihood of injustice was created. 
Therefore, his claims of evidentiary error are not grounds for 
reversal. 
Although the prosecutor appears to have violated the 
trial court's discovery order, the circumstances of this case 
persuasively establish that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that absent the prosecutor's error, the outcome of trial would 
have been more favorable for defendant. 
Finally, under well settled precedent from this Court, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give 
defendant's requested cautionary eyewitness identification 
instruction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE 
EITHER AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IN ADMITTING CERTAIN EVIDENCE 
OR ANY SIGNIFICANT PREJUDICE SUFFERED AS 
A RESULT OF THE ADMISSION OF THE CHALLENGED 
EVIDENCE, HE IS NOT ENTITLED fro A REVERSAL 
OF HIS CONVICTION, 
Defendant claims that he is entitled to a reversal of 
his conviction because the trial court erroneously admitted 
T 
evidence of prior misconduct through the testimony of Detective 
Ron Edwards and Yvonne Silcox. This claim is without merit. 
Defendant cites Edwards's testimony about an unrelated 
warrant concerning defendant as evidence that should have been 
i 
excluded under Utah R. Evid. 404(b).2 That testimony, which was 
unintentionally elicited by the prosecutor, resulted in an off-
the-record discussion between the court and counsel at side bar, 
after which the court admonished the jury to disregard Edwards's 
statement (R. 253-54). After the jury retired to deliberate, 
defendant stated on the record that he had made a specific 
objection to Edwards's testimony during the side bar discussion 
and had requested a mistrial on the ground that evidence of other 
misconduct by defendant had erroneously been presented to the 
2 Rule 404(b) provides: 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence ot other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show th&t he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, b£ admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, Opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, ideritity, or absence 
of mistake or accident. 
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jury (R. 389-90). The court noted the objection and motion# but 
indicated it would stand on its prior ruling against defendant 
(R. 391). 
Rule 404(b) clearly states that evidence of other 
wrongdoing by the accused is not admissible to prove his bad 
character or propensity to commit crime. State v. Pierce, 722 
P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986). The trial court obviously applied 
this principle when it admonished the jury to disregard Edwards's 
improper reference to the warrant. Because that reference was 
very brief, with no details given of the circumstances giving 
rise to the issuance of the warrant or the offense to which it 
related, there was little chance that the jury had been 
prejudiced significantly. £f. State v. Jensen, 727 P.2d 201, 
203 (Utah 1986). Indeed, the court's prompt and decisive action 
in response to the improper testimony obviated any harm that 
might have resulted. £f. State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185, 187 
(Utah 1986); State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985). 
Under the circumstances, the erroneous presentation of the 
evidence to the jury was harmless error because there is no 
reasonable likelihood that without the error there would have 
been a different result in defendant's trial. See State v. 
Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129 (Utah 1986) (citing State v. 
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982)); Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Utah 
R. Crim. P. 30(a) (UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-30(a)). In short, this 
minor evidentiary error could not have undermined confidence in 
the verdict. State v. Knight, 53 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 16-17, 
P.2d , (Utah 1987) (interpreting Rule 30(a)). 
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Silcox testified that she saw defendant in her store 
(which was not the store involved in this case) on December 23, 
1985, and that she picked defendant out of the lineup conducted 
on February 4, 1986. She recalled that defendant had several 
teeth missing when she saw him in the store, and that his hair 
was "longer and more yellowish-blond" then than at the time of 
the lineup (R. 226-29)• The prosecutor offered this evidence as 
corroborative of the robbery victims1 descriptions of how 
defendant appeared at the time of the robbery (before the 
lineup). As the prosecutor noted, defendant had significantly 
changed his appearance between the date of the robbery and that 
of the lineup. Defendant argued that Silcox could not give her 
identification testimony without leaving the impression that she 
had been a robbery victim of defendant in an incident unrelated 
to that for which he was being tried (R. 154-55). The trial 
court disagreed, stating: 
If she testifies as to having seen him on 
a date in December, without going into the details 
of under what circumstances, but nevertheless 
identifies him, I see no problem. 
(R. 155). 
It is well settled that "the trial courtfs ruling on 
the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent a 
showing that the trial court so abused its discretion as to 
create a likelihood that injustice resulted." State v. Royball, 
710 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1985). Accord State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 
1313, 1316 (Utah 1986); State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 
(Utah 1985); Utah R. Evid. 103(a). Although defendant chooses to 
characterize it otherwise, Silcox1s testimony hardly made clear 
-9-
that she was the victim of a prior unrelated robbery committed by 
defendant. There is little chance that the jury would naturally 
and necessarily construe her observation of defendant at another 
store and her subsequent presence at a lineup as evidence of a 
prior crime by defendant. Therefore, the trial court did not 
plainly violate Rule 404(b) or so abuse its discretion as to 
create a likelihood of injustice, and its ruling should be 
affirmed. Gray, 717 P.2d 1316; Rovball, 710 P.2d at 169. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD 
THAT ABSENT THE PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO 
DISCLOSE CERTAIN EVIDENCE TO DEFENDANT, 
THE OUTCOME OF TRIAL WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE 
FAVORABLE FOR DEFENDANT, REVERSAL OF HIS 
CONVICTION IS NOT WARRANTED. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to discover 
which sought, inter alia, disclosure of Malll written or 
recorded statements of the Defendant" (R. 17). After a hearing, 
the trial court ordered the prosecution to comply with 
defendant's discovery request (R. 25). At trial, the prosecutor 
called Detective Ron Edwards as a rebuttal witness. When it 
became apparent that Edwards was about to testify to the 
conversation he had with defendant upon arresting him for the 
instant robbery, defense counsel asked permission to approach the 
bench. After an off-the-record discussion at side bar, Edwards 
recounted defendant's post-arrest statements, which are set forth 
in this brief's statement of facts (R. 358-64). Br. of Resp. at 
5-6. After the jury had retired for deliberations, defendant 
placed his prior off-the-record objection to Edwards's testimony 
on the record, stating that the prosecutor had failed to disclose 
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to him, until minutes before trial, tne statements ne maae to 
Edwards. He then moved for a mistrial, but the court denied this 
relief (R. 389-91) . 
On appeal, defendant argues that His conviction should 
be reversed because he was significantly prejudiced when the 
trial court, once informed that the prosecution was about to 
present evidence it had failed to disclose to defendant pursuant 
to the court's discovery order, did not either exclude that 
evidence or grant defendant's request for a n^istrial. See Utah 
R. Crira. P. 16(g) (UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-16(g) (1982)).3 
Because there appears to be no dispute that tjhe prosecutor did 
not fully comply with the discovery order as it related to 
defendant's statements to Edwards,4 see Utah k. Crim. P. 16(a) 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-16(a) (1982)); State V. Knight, 53 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 13, 14-16, P.2d , (1987), whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motions to 
exclude or for a mistrial "depends entirely upbn a determination 
of whether the prosecutor's failure to produce| the requested 
information resulted in prejudice sufficient tb warrant reversal 
3 Rule 16(g) provides: 
If at any time during the course of the proceedings 
it is brought to the attention of the court that a party 
has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order 
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant 
a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing 
evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other 
order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
4
 Nothing in the record indicates that the prosecutor argued that 
there had been no discovery violation or that t\\e disclosure of 
defendant's statements immediately before trial satisfied the 
court's discovery order. 
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under [Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-30(a) 
(1982)]," the harmless error rule.5 Knight, 53 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
16. 
In Knight, the Court thoroughly analyzed the operation 
of Rule 30(a) in the context of a discovery violation by the 
prosecution (wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence). 
It clarified the meaning of its previous interpretations of Rule 
30(a) that "an error warrants reversal 'only if a review of the 
record persuades the court that without the error there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant,'" by holding that "Iflor an error to require reversal, 
the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high 
to undermine confidence in the verdict." Knight, 53 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 16-17 (citations and footnote omitted; emphasis in 
original). Under Knight, 
when the defendant can make a credible argument 
that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the 
defense, it is up to the State to persuade the 
court that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that absent the error, the outcome of trial 
would have been more favorable for the defendant. 
53 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17. The State "can meet this burden by 
showing that despite the errors, the outcome of trial merits 
confidence and there is no reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for defendant." Ld. at 18. 
5
 Rule 30(a) states: 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall 
be disregarded. 
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Here, the prosecutor offered Edwards's rebuttal 
testimony in an effort to impeach defendant's chief alibi 
witness, Darlene Newsome. Introduction of defendant's post-
arrest statements to Edwards, which were incpnsistent with 
Newsome1s testimony in a number of significant respects, clearly 
could have cast doubt on the credibility of Newsome1s explanation 
for the gunshot wound to defendant's foot.6 However, the State 
presented substantial evidence in its case-in-chief which 
seriously undermined defendant's alibi evidence. Compelling 
direct and circumstantial evidence established that defendant was 
the person who robbed the video store and suffered a gunshot 
wound from a gun tucked in his belt as he ran from the scene. 
This evidence alone powerfully rebutted defendant's suggestion 
that he was at his mother's home at the time of the robbery and 
suffered the injury to his foot the day before when a gun handed 
to him by another person accidentally discharged. In comparison, 
Edwards's testimony had only secondary value. Unlike the 
defendant in Knight, 53 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17-18, defendant does 
not specifically state what effect the nondisclosure had on 
pretrial strategy, the preparation of his case, or his strategy 
at trial. Perhaps he would have reconsidered u£ing Newsome as an 
alibi witness, had he known that the State would present his 
post-arrest statements. On the other hand, given the substantial 
evidence presented by the State in its case-in-chief, defendant 
0
 This evidence was inculpatory insofar as it impeached 
defendant's primary alibi evidence. The prosecution, of course, 
was aware of defendant's alibi defense prior to tibial (R. 26). 
may well have chosen to take his chances with Newsomef even 
knowing the inconsistencies between her anticipated testimony and 
his statements to Edwards. Finally, Edwards's rebuttal testimony 
aside, Newsome's account of an accidental shooting was not 
consistent with the testimony of other defense witnesses, who 
testified that defendant told them that a Jeep had caused the 
injury to his foot (R. 301f 318). 
Assuming that defendant has made a credible argument 
that the prosecutor's error impaired his defense, the 
circumstances of defendant's case, which are outlined above, 
persuasively establish that the error did not unfairly prejudice 
the defense. See Knight, 53 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17. Confidence in 
the verdict simply was not undermined. Ibid. See also United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (erosion-of-confidence 
criterion applied in a case involving nondisclosure of 
impeachment evidence); State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275-76 
(Utah 1985) (defendant failed to show a "reasonable probability" 
that the undisclosed evidence would have affected the outcome of 
trial); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985) (failure 
to disclose evidence did not so mislead defendant as to cause 
prejudicial error); State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981) 
(surprise testimony was without prejudicial effect). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED CAUTIONARY 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTION. 
The trial court refused to give defendant's requested 
cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification, which was 
modeled after the one recommended in United States v. Telfaire, 
469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Defendant claims that this was 
reversible error. 
Prior to its recent opinion in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1986), this Court had repeatedly held that special 
instructions on eyewitness identification ("Telfaire" 
instructions) were not mandatory; instead, the decision on 
whether to give Telfaire instructions was discretionary with the 
trial court. E.g. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 
1985); State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1984); State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 
39, 40 (Utah 1984). Because defendant's case was tried prior to 
the Long decision, the old discretionary standard, rather than 
the mandatory standard adopted for prospective application in 
Long, 721 P.2d at 492, applies to defendant's case. Under the 
discretionary standard, the circumstances of the eyewitness 
identifications in defendant's case, unlike those identified in 
Long, 721 P.2d at 487-88, and State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378, 1381 
(Utah 1986), did not require the court to give the cautionary 
instruction. This is consistent with decisions of this Court in 
similar cases. E.g. State v. Remington, 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4, 
P.2d , (1987); State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 
1984). S^e also Jonas, 725 P.2d at 1380-81 (summarizing the 
circumstances of eyewitness identifications in pre-Long cases 
where there was no abuse of discretion in not giving a Telfaire 
instruction). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
convictions should be affirmed. ^j~Jh~— 
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